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Abstract
We use a novel enterprise survey to gauge the relationship between saving instruments and en-
trepreneurial reinvestment. We show that while most informal saving practices are not associated
with a lower likelihood of reinvestment when compared with formal saving practices, there is a
significantly lower association of saving within the household with the likelihood of reinvesting
profits than other savings form, most importantly, formal saving forms. This result is robust
to the model specification and controlling for a large array of variables including district-level
fixed effects. We also provide empirical tests to address reverse causation and omitted variable
concerns. Our work contributes to the recent debate on the implications of different saving instru-
ments in developing countries and expands the entrepreneurial financing constraints literature by
focusing on internal rather than external funding constraints.
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1 Introduction
In developing countries, intermediation costs and enforcement frictions constrain entrepreneurs’ access
to external finance - leaving their retained earnings as a key element for small business growth. For
instance, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008) document that small enterprises in developing
countries finance on average at least 60% of their investment through earnings retention. Given the
importance of internal financing for sustainable business growth in developing world, saving for business
purposes is expected to be positively correlated with earnings reinvestment decisions. In this paper
we suggest that the saving mechanism itself might be a critical element in determining the ability
of entrepreneurs to reinvest. Given the limited access to formal saving services, in many developing
countries, entrepreneurs use informal mechanisms of saving and liquidity management (Allen et al.
(2005 and 2012); Collins et al. (2009)). Entrepreneurs saving via informal channels, however, are more
likely to have limited access to their savings. For instance, members of ROSCAs cannot access their
savings until their turn comes1, unless there is a relevant secondary market (Calomiris and Rajamaran
(1998)). Similarly, saving via household members might inhibit entrepreneurs from reinvesting, because
of redistributive pressures and commitment problems.
In this paper, we utilize a novel entrepreneurial survey to explore whether entrepreneurial saving prac-
tices have an association with entrepreneurs’ reinvestment decisions. Specifically, we gauge whether the
decision to save with formal financial institutions, individually (under the mattress), within the house-
hold or via other informal arrangements, such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs),
is related to the decision to reinvest entrepreneurial earnings. We motivate our empirical work with a
simple theoretical model that shows that an entrepreneur’s reinvestment decision depends on the en-
trepreneur’s saving practice, in addition to productivity and borrowing capacity of her entrepreneurial
firm. We show that entrepreneurs are more likely to invest in their businesses if they save in a fash-
ion which allows them easy access to their funds, such as formal savings accounts or personal saving
mechanisms.
To test the empirical relationship between saving patterns and entrepreneurial reinvestment decisions,
we use a micro- and small enterprise (MSE) survey for over 6,000 entrepreneurs conducted in 2010
in Tanzania. The sample of entrepreneurs surveyed covers a large variety of enterprises in different
locations and of different gender, educational profile and sectors. We document that entrepreneurs’
saving practices do indeed co-vary with the likelihood of earnings retention at MSEs. The survey
design allows us to differentiate between different savings vehicles, including within household saving,
saving under the pillow, informal savings clubs, and formal deposit accounts. Our results show that the
probability of reinvestment is significantly higher for savers and that when compared against formal
deposit account holders, entrepreneurs with informal saving practices are significantly less likely to
reinvest.2 However, our analysis also shows that the type of informal saving instrument might be
important in generating an adverse consequence for reinvestment. Specifically, we find that when we
1See Besley et al. (1993) for a theoretical discussion of ROSCAs).
2Our survey does not contain information on actual investment as we will discuss in more detail below.
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compare the practice of keeping savings within the household against the practice of having a deposit
account at a formal financial institution, the latter is more likely to be associated with reinvestment
than the former. Other informal savers do not exhibit significantly different reinvestment rates when
compared against formal savers.
While the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to make complete claims on causality, we
conduct a series of checks to ensure the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional control
variables, alternative model specifications, and endogeneity biases. First, stable coefficient estimates
across an array of specifications show that it is unlikely that our results are driven by omitted variable
bias even after including an array of additional variables - as proposed by Altonji et al. (2005).
Second, in spite of the difficulty to identify truly exogenous determinants of saving patterns that affect
reinvestment decisions not directly, we report instrumental variable regressions with the distance to
the nearest bank as instrument.
While research on finance and investment has almost exclusively concentrated on the impact of external
finance constraints on investment behavior, our paper adds to a very recent literature arguing that
relaxing the internal finance constraints is vital for investment and enterprise growth in developing
countries as much as allowing for access to external finance. In this respect, Banerjee and Duflo (2011)
suggest that saving constraints in the developing world could imply poverty traps for low income
households. Karlan, Ratan and Zinman (2013) state in their survey article that undersaving can have
important welfare consequences, such as variable consumption, low resilience to shocks, and foregone
profitable investments. Using experimental settings, Dupas and Robinson (2013) show positive effects
of providing access to formal savings accounts on micro-entrepreneurs’ investment in Kenya, while
Brune et al. (2013) find in a study for Malawian cash crop farmers that using a commitment savings
product increases investment and crop output.
Our paper makes several contributions to this new financial development research agenda, which
focuses on inefficiency of savings and real economic performance. First, our paper shows theoretically
and empirically that different informal saving practices among entrepreneurs in developing countries
can have different implications for investment decisions. Second, we show that a large spectrum of
informal saving mechanisms are not associated with a lower likelihood of entrepreneurial reinvestment
relative to saving formally. Rather, we show a significant negative association of one particular informal
saving method, namely, saving within the household with reinvestment likelihood, and highlight this
inefficient saving practice as a channel through which formal financial development policies could
induce entrepreneurial investment in developing countries.
Tanzania is a perfect setting to test the relationship between different saving practices and en-
trepreneurial investment decisions. Tanzania is a low-income country in East Africa, whose private
sector is dominated by micro- and small enterprises. While the financial sector was liberalized in the
1990s and there is a large number of formal financial institutions, access to formal financial services is
very low, with only 17% of adults having a formal bank account in 2011 (World Bank (2012)). Tan-
zania shares many characteristics with other low-income countries in Africa, including a very disperse
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population and a high degree of informality.
This paper relates to several distinct literatures. First, our study relates to research on finance and
entrepreneurial reinvestment, which has shown that entrepreneurs invest more of their profits if they
expect higher private returns from their investment activity (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998)). Johnson et al. (2002) show the importance of property rights in explaining the earnings
reinvestment among entrepreneurial firms across several Eastern European countries, while Cull and
Xu (2005) show that both property right protection and access to external finance in the form of bank
loans are associated with more reinvestment by Chinese entrepreneurs. We add to this literature by
focusing on saving patterns as an additional factor to explain the variation in reinvestment decisions
across micro- and small entrepreneurs.
Second, our paper relates to a growing literature on the relative importance of formal and informal
financing mechanisms in developing countries (Allen et al. (2005) and (2012); Ayyagari et al. (2010);
Chavis et al. (2011)) that has investigated the extensive use of informal financing sources, especially
by small and young firms. We add to this literature by focusing on different informal savings vehicles.
By this we contribute to understanding where and when the benefits might not exceed the large fixed
costs associated with increasing the outreach of formal financial institutions (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,
and Martinez Peria (2007)).
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on barriers to save in developing countries (see Karlan,
Ratan and Zinman (2013), for an overview). In addition to geographic, monetary and regulatory
barriers, there are significant social constraints on saving behavior, partly related to the position of
the entrepreneur within the household. Previous research has linked participation in informal savings
clubs, such as ROSCAs, to intra-household bargaining problems (e.g., Besley et al. (1993), Anderson
and Baland (2002)). We contribute to this literature by documenting how different informal savings
vehicles are related to the likelihood of entrepreneurial reinvestment.
Before proceeding, we would like to address an important methodological issue. Unlike many other
papers in this literature that discuss randomized control trials (RCTs), our paper relies on cross-
sectional survey data and thus faces the usual endogeneity biases. While we address these concerns by
using instrumental variables and by exploring the differential relationship between savings patterns and
reinvestment decision across different entrepreneurial groups, we clearly recognize the limits of such
cross-sectional analysis in drawing causal inference. However, our analysis allows a broader exploration
of reinvestment decisions across a variety of different informal savings patterns and we complement
our empirical analysis with a theoretical exploration of different savings mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model to show how
saving practices can influence entrepreneurial investment. Section 3 discusses the regression set-up.
Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 discusses our main findings, while section 6 tests for reverse
causality, and provides an extensive list of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
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2 A 2-Period Model
In this section we develop a partial equilibrium heterogeneous firms model to study the interactions
between entrepreneurial business saving practices and profit reinvestment. This allows us to formalize
empirically testable hypotheses, which we confront with data in section 5.
2.1 Environment
There are two time periods, 1 and 2 ; a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by i; and a good - called
cash. Cash can be invested, saved or consumed. Entrepreneurs have linear preferences:
Ui = c1,i + βc2,i, (1)
where U is the life-time utility and c1 and c2 are consumption levels in period-1 and in period-2
respectively. The parameter β is a discount factor.
In the beginning of period-1, each entrepreneur is endowed with ω units of investable funds which
we assume to be homogeneously distributed among all entrepreneurs in the economy. In period-1,
entrepreneurs can utilize the ω-endowment to re-invest as productive capital (k1,i), save as liquid
reserves for business purposes (s1,i), or consume (c1,i), yielding the budget constraint for period-1:
k1,i + c1,i + s1,i ≤ ω.
Each entrepreneur has access to a production technology that converts productive capital (k1,i) into
the output of period-2. The output realization of the entrepreneurial technology is conditional on a
liquidity injection at the beginning of period-2.3 Specifically, entrepreneur i’s technology yields Aik1,i
units of cash in period-2 in return of k1,i units of capital investment in period-1 plus an additional
L(k1,i) if and only if the entrepreneur is capable of injecting L(k1,i) units of funds at the beginning
of the period-2 that is equal to or greater than `2k1,i. In this production technology, the parameter
Ai > 1 captures the productivity heterogeneity across entrepreneurs. The liquidity needs (L) can be
financed via two sources:
(1): The entrepreneur can save cash from period-1 to period-2, which we will call saving for business
purposes denoted by s1,i, at a rate ζi with ζi ≤ 1. In this formulation, ζi captures the efficiency of
the saving practice in transferring funds from one period to the other. We assume that there are
two general saving practice types: Formal (bank deposits) (ζF ) and informal (in various forms) (ζI,i).
We suppose that ζF = 1 for those who save at a bank deposit account, whereas ζI,i is heterogeneous
across agents. We assume, for instance, that “under the mattress” savers are more likely to keep the
saved funds untouched by the remaining household members compared to those who save (and share)
3This can be thought of an additional working capital requirement for the effective use of the fixed asset investment,
such as, e.g., utility costs.
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together “with other household members”.
(2): The entrepreneur can borrow, denoted with b2,i, up to a θi fraction of `2k1,i in the financial market
at a gross interest rate 1, where θi is an entrepreneur specific parameter capturing the ability to raise
working capital finance externally. Formally:
θi`2k1,i ≥ b2,i.
Based on this specification, we can state the entrepreneurial total output at the end of the period-2
as follows:
y2,i = Aik1,i + L(k1,i) if L(k1,i) ≥ `2k1,i,
= L(k1,i) if L(k1,i) < `2k1,i. (2)
The functional form (2) makes clear that if and only if the expected liquidity needs in period-2 can be
financed, the capital available to entrepreneur i will yield the cash-flow generated by the technology,
Aik1,i, in addition to the firm’s liquidity holdings.
4 Hence, in this economy, firms must have the
capacity to manage liquid reserves in order to be able to exploit productive investment opportunities.
Entrepreneurs consume and repay using the period-2 output - yielding the following second-period
budget constraint
c2,i + b2,i + L(k1,i) ≤ y2,i + b2,i + s1,iζi. (3)
Idiosyncratic parameters θ, A and ζ are drawn from a distribution function at the beginning of the
period-1. Table 1 specifies the timing of events in both periods of the model.
- Table 1 about here -
2.2 Optimizing Behavior and Testable Hypotheses
Entrepreneurs maximize life-time preferences delineated at (1) subject to (2) and (3). An immediate
implication of this model is that if and only if k1,i > 0, the entrepreneur forecasts that there will be
sufficient capacity to finance future liquidity needs. Therefore, the entrepreneur sets k1,i = 0 if his
capacity to finance liquidity is sufficiently low. This implies that as long as k1,i > 0 we have two
additional constraints that need to hold:
L(k1,i) ≤ s1,iζi + b2,i, (4)
θiL(k1,i) ≥ b2,i. (5)
4This type of a production function specification has been previously utilized in finance and development literature
by Aghion et al. (2010): In their dynamic general equilibrium model, the authors introduce a complementarity between
the ability to cope with future liquidity needs and current long-term investment and explain the negative correlation
between volatility and growth observed in the cross-country data.
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The qualitative properties of this model are then as follows. Entrepreneurs who choose a k1,i > 0
exhaust their borrowing limit θi. This is implied by the assumption that carrying over cash is inefficient;
or, more formally ζI,i < ζF = 1 < Ai ∀i. Hence, we have b2,i = θiL(k1,i). Then using (4) with equality:
s1,i =
(
1− θi
ζi
)
L(k1,i). (6)
Equation (6) implies that the lower ζ the higher is the amount of savings for business purposes - for
those entrepreneurs who choose to invest. Using (6) in budget constraints (2) and (3) yields:
c1 = ωi − k1,i −
(
1− θi
ζi
)
L(k1,i), (7)
c2 = Aik1,i + (1− θi)L(k1,i). (8)
Letting the idiosyncratic rate of return from investment - or in other words the willingness to postpone
consumption - be denoted with ρi, the optimal consumption plans implied by (1) are:
c1,i > 0, c2,i = 0 if ρi <
1
β
,
c1,i = 0, c2,i > 0 if ρi >
1
β
, (9)
where using (7) and (8) we can show that ρi =
Ai+(1−θi)`2
1+`2
(
1−θi
ζi
) . The linear structure of the model implies
that the entire beginning of the period earnings (ω) get utilized for the business via either capital
re-investment (k > 0) or keeping liquid savings to satisfy working capital needs (s > 0) if and only if
the efficiency of operating the entrepreneurial technology is large enough. Using (7) and (8), we solve
for the unit production efficiency of capital for the entrepreneur, who chooses to re-invest earnings
into her technology (ρ). We then compare the unit efficiency of operating the technology against
the minimum required rate of return presented at equation (9); namely 1/β, that would make the
entrepreneur willing to choose k > 0 and s > 0 (and hence consume in period 2) instead of k = 0 and
s = 0 (and consume in period 1).
In this model, capital re-investment (k > 0) refers to an illiquid capital investment, which cannot
be used to satisfy liquid working capital needs in the second period. This is the reason why the
entrepreneur saves liquidity to be utilized for business purposes (s > 0) and additionally demands
external finance (b > 0) as long as k > 0. In this respect, the total investment in the model exceeds
re-invested capital k (because of the presence of savings and external finance), but s > 0 and b > 0 are
liquid funds and do not correspond to illiquid (fixed) capital investment of an entrepreneurial firm.
Finally, applying comparative statics at ρi, we capture the key empirically testable implications of the
model as the following:
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Hypothesis 1: Efficiency of saving practice (high ζi) increases the likelihood of reinvestment.
5
Hypothesis 2: High borrowing capacity (high θi) increases the likelihood of reinvestment.
6
Hypothesis 3: Productivity (high Ai) increases the likelihood of reinvestment.
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There is a close relationship between the variable k (capital reinvestment) and the variable s (saving
for business purposes) in our model and specific survey questions that we will utilize to measure k
and s. Specifically, we use the survey questions “Does ’I re-invest some of the profits back into the
business?’ apply to your business? (Yes/No)” to capture k and “Do you save for business purposes?
(Yes/No)”, to capture s.
3 The Empirical Methodology
We test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model with a dataset collected from Tanzanian
MSEs by the Financial Sector Deepening Trust of Tanzania. Specifically, we test whether entrepreneurs
with more efficient saving patterns are more likely to reinvest. The reinvestment decision corresponds to
the entrepreneurial decision in the theoretical model of investing the initial entrepreneurial endowment
into physical capital. To test whether saving practices affect the decision to reinvest, we follow the
literature and utilize a binary outcome variable reinvest, which equals one if the entrepreneur invests
some of the profits back into business. We then estimate the following model
Prob{Reinvesti} = α + γ′Si + χ′Controlsi + i, (10)
where i denotes the entrepreneur, S is a vector of saving practices comprised of dummy variable(s)
which take(s) the value of 1 if the entrepreneur has the corresponding saving practice (see below for
details) and  is the error term. Since our dependent variable is binary, we estimate probit models
for all different specifications of (10), and report marginal effects at mean levels for the coefficient
estimates unless we state otherwise. The key empirical conjecture that we have in this analysis - based
on hypothesis 1 that we derived in Section 2 - is that entrepreneurs with more efficient saving practices
are more likely to reinvest.
We focus on reinvestment in our empirical analysis rather than investment for several reasons. First,
while entrepreneurs are typically reluctant (or unable) to talk about specific amounts on investment
or profits, it is easier to extract information on whether or not they have used their retained earnings
for investment (Cull and Xu (2005)). For these reasons, our survey - as many other enterprise surveys
- does not contain a reliable question on the actual amount of investment (to document quantities).
5Taking the first-partial derivative of ρ with respect to ζ we can see that ∂ρ∂ζ =
(
1
ζ2
){
`2(1−θ)(A+(1−θ)`2)
[1+`2( 1−θζ )]
2
}
> 0.
6Defining z ≡ 1−θ
ζ2
and taking the first-partial derivative of ρ with respect to θ, we get ∂ρ∂θ =
`2
z (A−1)
[1+`2ζz]
2 > 0.
7Taking the first-partial derivative of ρ with respect to A, we get ∂ρ∂A =
1
1+`2ζz
> 0.
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Therefore, earnings retention provides researchers often-times with a more reliable measure of invest-
ment. Second, our focus - both theoretically and empirically - concerns the capacity of entrepreneurs
to self-finance. For our empirical work, we therefore prefer the reinvestment decision as dependent
variable rather than investment (which might come from outside sources). This allows us to isolate
the link between saving patterns and investment of entrepreneurs in their own company.
The vector of control variables included in the benchmark model is composed of an array of en-
trepreneurial and enterprise characteristics, partly informed by our theoretical analysis. First, we
control for firms’ past borrowing history. Specifically, Borrowed is a dummy variable which takes the
value of one if the entrepreneur has ever borrowed to cover business needs, and is a proxy for the θi
parameter in the theoretical model. Following testable hypothesis 2, businesses that have access to
external finance are expected to reinvest more frequently.
Second, we use income level, education and business training history of entrepreneurs as proxies of
entrepreneurial productivity Ai from our theoretical model. We conjecture that entrepreneurs with
a higher household income can save more and as a result reinvest more often. To control for the
income effects, we use self-reported monthly personal income levels.8 Entrepreneurs with a high human
capital are expected to be more committed to business growth, and to have higher rates of earnings
retention. We therefore use the highest level of formal education completed by the respondents, as well
as an indicator of entrepreneurial training, as this should matter for expected business performance
and reinvestment behavior. According to hypothesis 3, proxies of productivity should be positively
associated with reinvestment probability.
Third, although they are not discussed in our model, we additionally control for gender and marital
status as previous studies showed that both can influence investment decisions (Iversen et al. (2006),
Ashraf (2009), de Mel et al., (2009) and Fafchamps et al. (2013)). Specifically, we expect female
entrepreneurs to face more claims on their income from spouse and family members. Similarly, married
entrepreneurs might face more claimants on the business profits and might therefore be less likely to
reinvest. Finally, we include sectoral dummies to control for sectoral performance that might explain
reinvestment heterogeneity, as well as regional dummies to control for geographic heterogeneity in
profitability, reinvestment and availability of different savings vehicles.
- Figure 1 about here -
We empirically explore the relationship between specific forms of savings and the likelihood of reinvest-
ment. Figure 1 summarizes how we classify different saving practices. Specifically, our survey allows
us to identify two types of saving practices among Tanzanian entrepreneurs:
1. Save formal : This practice includes the entrepreneurs who save their funds at formal financial
institutions such as commercial banks, microfinance institutions or cooperatives.9
8Each respondent is asked which income range (e.g. TSHS 35 001 - TSHS 40 000 per month) describes their income
level best. We use the median of that range (e.g. TSHS 37500.5) as the income level of the respondent.
9So entrepreneurs who save only formal and save both formal and informal (please see below for the definitions) are
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2. Save informal : We consider entrepreneurs who do not save formally in this group.
This separation corresponds to the control-treatment group set-up of many randomized control trials
that assess the impact of using formal saving products on household and entrepreneurial outcomes. In
addition, however, our survey allows a finer classification to exploit the considerable heterogeneity in
terms of informal saving practices. Therefore we first divide save informal into two groups:
1. Save informal individually : A large fraction of entrepreneurs in Tanzania save their funds only
in a secret hiding place or a piggy bank, i.e. a cash container.
2. Save informal with others : This refers to practices of saving funds via informal saving clubs,
such as ROSCAs, moneylenders or within household.10
To distinguish whether our entrepreneurs save through people living in the household or people who
are not member of the same household, we decompose the practice of “Save informal with others”
further:
1. Save with household members : The group comprises of entrepreneurs who give their funds to
other household members to keep them safe.
2. Save with people outside household : The group contains entrepreneurs who save through ROSCAs
or moneylenders.11
We again conjecture that entrepreneurs in the second group have more control over their savings than
entrepreneurs in the first group, especially if the latter have limited intra-household bargaining power.
In our regression analysis, we will use a dummy variable for each saving practice above (see Table 2
below for the descriptions) and work with different samples to compare both savers and non-savers
but also different groups of savers in their reinvestment behaviour.
4 The Data
The survey data was collected by the Financial Sector Deepening Trust Tanzania in 2010 from a
nationwide representative cross-section of 6,083 micro- and small enterprises.12 The respondents of
considered in this group. Out of 597 formal savers, 186 also save informally, mostly individually. Only 19 formal savers
also save with household members.
10Entrepreneurs who both save informal individually and save informally with others are considered in this group.
Our results are robust when we create a separate dummy variable for this group having both saving practices and add
them to the regressions.
11We do not include the entrepreneurs who both save informal with household members and save informal with people
outside household in our analysis, because they are very few (only 7 observations) and classifying those in one group is
difficult. Including those observations in either group do not change our results.
12Appendix B lists the relevant survey questions.
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the questionnaire are entrepreneurs with an active business as of September 2010. Table 2 presents
both detailed definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics of the sample.
- Table 2 about here -
The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average number of employees among
Tanzanian MSEs is 1.5 workers, ranging from one (i.e. self-employed) to 80 employees. 13 However,
the median is one employee and 97% of entrepreneurs are self-employed. The average initial capital is
about 35 USD and average monthly sales are 149 USD. The key question which we exploit to capture
entrepreneurs’ earnings retention asks whether the respondent reinvests some of the profits back into
business. As we present in Table 2, 76% of the sample entrepreneurs engage in earnings retention.
The sectoral breakdown in Panel B of Table 2 exhibits substantial variation: 54% and 30% of the
businesses that operate in trade and service sectors, respectively, while 15% of enterprises that operate
in manufacturing retain fractions of their earnings in their business.
Panel C of Table 2 presents characteristics of entrepreneurs and enterprises. About 50% of the en-
trepreneurs in the sample are female, 10% of the entrepreneurs are single. 30% of the sample en-
trepreneurs received business related training, and about 87% of the entrepreneurs have less than
completed secondary education. 75% of the enterprises are located in rural areas. The median monthly
personal income of entrepreneurs is 106 USD.14
Panel D of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics regarding the financing patterns of enterprises in our
sample. Only 18% of all sample entrepreneurs ever borrowed for business purposes; 3% of entrepreneurs
in the sample borrowed from a bank or MFI, 2% borrowed from a semi-formal financial institution,
such as a SACCO or village bank and 6% borrowed from an informal source, such as money lenders,
savings club or family and friends.
Saving is a common habit among the entrepreneurs in our sample. We utilize an extensive margin
question asking whether the entrepreneur saves for business purposes, and distinguish savers from the
rest of the population: 77% of the entrepreneurs in the sample save for business purposes. However
there is considerable heterogeneity among saving practices of Tanzanian entrepreneurs. Informal in-
dividual saving is the most popular practice among Tanzanian entrepreneurs. 75% of the savers save
informal-individually whereas only 13% of them save formally. Likewise, 13% of the savers do not save
at a formal financial institution and instead save their funds via people outside the household such as
members of ROSCAs and moneylenders or give them to household members.
Table 3 provides a uni-variate comparison between micro-entrepreneurs that reinvest and that do not
reinvest. In line with our theoretical model, we find that borrowers and entrepreneurs with higher
13The relationship between business owners’s saving and re-investment decisions might be weak in large businesses
because of managerial layers. We test the robustness of our main result by excluding the businesses larger than 10 from
our sample. Estimates reported in Table 2 do not change.
14This is computed with the average exchange rate for 2010. If using PPP exchange rates, the corresponding median
income would be 288 dollars.
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educational attainment and income are more likely to reinvest. Female entrepreneurs are less likely
to reinvest. We do not find significant differences between entrepreneurs that do and do not reinvest
in terms of marital status and training. Most importantly, entrepreneurs that reinvest are also more
likely to save. This difference will be the focus of the following regression analysis, where we will dig
deeper in terms of different savings vehicles, and their relationship with the likelihood of reinvestment.
- Table 3 about here -
Table OA1 in the Online Appendix presents a correlation matrix concerning the variables of interest
for our analysis. The key variables such as “being a saver” and “retaining earnings within the business”
exhibit a strong correlation. However, the sign of the relationship seems to be dependent on the saving
practice of the respondents. In particular saving via others seems to be negatively correlated with firm
reinvestment whereas formal and informal individual savers have higher reinvestment rates.
5 Saving Practices and Reinvestment: Main Results
Table 4 reports the marginal effects for the benchmark regression. We report heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Panel A reports regression results, while Panel B reports the difference
in marginal effects between different groups of savers.
- Table 4 about here -
The results in the first column show that the probability of reinvestment is higher for both groups of
savers compared to non-savers. Specifically, ceteris paribus, the reinvestment probability of an average
Tanzanian MSE who saves informally is around six percentage points higher than for an entrepreneur
who does not save, while the reinvestment probability of an average Tanzanian MSE who saves formally
is around nine percentage points higher. The results in Panel B show a significant difference between
formal and informal savers in the likelihood to reinvest. We also find that entrepreneurs with access
to formal loans are more likely to reinvest, while formal business training increases the likelihood
of reinvestment in business projects. Female and married entrepreneurs are less likely, while richer
entrepreneurs are more likely to invest. Overall, these results are consistent with our theoretical
predictions as discussed above and the existing literature.
In the next step, we study the implications of different saving practices on reinvestment. In order to
test the predictions from our theoretical model, we rank saving practices based on their vulnerability
to consumption temptations - as we discussed above - and investigate the implications of the variations
in saving methods for the probability to reinvest. Specifically, we rank the “within household savers”
as the group for whom the vulnerability to consuming savings is the highest. On the other extreme,
we expect the most committed savers to be “formal savers” due to the highest opportunity cost of
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consumption - resulting from the foregone interest income. Finally, comparing “informal individual
savers” with “informal savers with others”, we conjecture that while the redistributive pressure problem
might be lower for the former, there would be a potential inflexibility to withdrawing savings when
needed associated with the latter.
The results in column 2 of Table 4 show that entrepreneurs who save with others are seven percentage
points less likely to reinvest than entrepreneurs who save formally, while entrepreneurs who save
informally but individually are not significantly less likely to reinvest than “formal savers”. Both
formal savers and informal individual savers are more likely to reinvest than non-savers.
Finally, we focus on the group of respondents who save with others. We independently study the
investment likelihood of household savers and respondents who save outside the household compared
to the reinvestment probability of formal savers. The results in column (3) show that that with
household member savers are ten percentage points less likely to reinvest than formal savers, a result
significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, we also show that savers with people outside household are
five percentage points less likely to reinvest than formal savers, though this result is significant only
at the 10% level. There is no significant difference between savers with household members and savers
with people outside the household. As before, formal and informal individual savers are more likely to
reinvest than non-savers, while there is no significant difference between informal savers with others
and non-savers.
In summary, our baseline empirical results are consistent with our theoretical model showing that
inefficient saving practices are associated with a lower likelihood of reinvestment. They suggest that
informal saving practices are associated with significantly lower likelihood of earnings retention com-
pared to formal saving mechanisms. It is important to note that this finding is mainly driven by the
difference in the reinvestment likelihood of within household savers and formal savers, for which the
difference is most pronounced and statistically significant.
6 Robustness and Reverse Causality
While controlling for other enterprise and entrepreneurial characteristics reduces the risk that the
relationship between savings patterns and the likelihood of reinvestment is a spurious one, we cannot
exclude the possibility that our relationship is driven by different sources of endogeneity, including
reverse causation and omitted variable bias. In this section, we present several robustness tests to
mitigate concerns of reverse causation and omitted variable biases. We first conduct a series of checks
to ensure the robustness of our key result to inclusion and exclusion of additional control variables and
model specification before presenting instrumental variable estimates. We would like to stress that
these different tests serve to mitigate concerns of endogeneity, but still do not allow us to draw clear
causal inferences from our cross-sectional observational data.
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6.1 Robustness tests
First, we address the potential mis-specification of our non-linear probit model. Table OA2 in the On-
line Appendix provides a set of regression results using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. Our
coefficient estimates are consistent and significant, hence stable vis-a-vis our baseline probit regres-
sion estimates. Specifically, the OLS estimation shows that saving informally is negatively correlated
with the likelihood of earnings retention compared to the formal saving mechanism, and this negative
co-variance is significantly driven by the practice of saving with other household members.15
Second, we test the robustness of our key result to the inclusion of a vector of additional control
variables, reported in Table OA3 in the Online Appendix. First, we add specific dummy variables
for different sources of external finance at the start-up of the enterprise: formal, semi-formal and
informal loans. However, none of the external financing variables have significant explanatory power
for reinvestment likelihood. Second, we control for entrepreneurial types by utilizing the answers to
the following survey question: “why did you go to business?”16 As evidenced in the previous literature
(Bruhn and Zia (2011)), transformational type entrepreneurs are expected to have higher rates of
investment profitability and earnings retention rate compared to survival type entrepreneurs. Third,
we add dummy variables to control for the type of the activity the business conducts. The activity
of the business (e.g. buying and re-selling; buying, adding value and re-selling, providing a service
etc.) may change the definition of reinvestment for business owner and timing of the reinvestment.17
The estimates for the variables are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. Fourth, we include the
logarithm of the initial start-up capital, the logarithm of current sales per employee, the logarithm of
the duration of business and the logarithm of number of workers, since these size gauges are expected
to determine the growth potential of a business- and hence the profitability of reinvestment. We also
control for rural vs. urban location of the enterprise, as the accessibility to infrastructure might affect
expectations and drive variations in reinvestment rates. Fifth, we control for number of businesses
owned by the household by adding two dummy variables: 2 businesses and more than 2 businesses
in the household. The survey respondents may save with other household members to reinvest to
higher productivity businesses of other household members. So, the negative correlation between save
within household and reinvestment may be due to multiple business ownership in the household.18
15In unreported robustness tests, we also use a matching model, focusing on the sub-group of formal savers and
savers with household members. Doing this allows for a non-linear correlation between our explanatory variables and
the decision to reinvest. Specifically, we match each entrepreneur who saves with household members with the three
(nearest) counterfactual entrepreneurs who save formally - on the basis of the control variables listed in section 3 and
column 3 of Table 4 - and confirm our previous findings.
16Entrepreneurs selected from a list of statements to indicate why they went into business. Multiple choices were
available. The answers include: I was fired / lost/retrenched from a previous job; I couldn’t find a job elsewhere; To
support me / my family; To try out a business idea; I believe I can make more money working for myself than for
someone else; I had nothing else to do/no other means of survival/no better option; parents / relatives were in business;
I saw a good opportunity; I have always wanted my own business; I was encouraged by friends and relatives; I needed
to supplement my income; Others, please specify.
17We include 5 separate dummy variables for the businesses buying and selling goods; buying, adding value and selling
goods; making and selling goods; providing service; and other activities including agricultural ones.
18We also re-run the model for only the respondents who are members of households with one business. Our coefficient
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Including all of these control variables does not affect our key empirical finding. We also replace the
region fixed effects with district fixed effects to ensure that we are capturing geographical variations
well enough that could explain the probability of reinvestment (column 2 of Table OA3). While our
sample becomes smaller, our findings remain.19
Finally, as an additional check of omitted variable bias, we provide a stability test for our key regressions
with saving with household members in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005). Specifically, as Bellows
and Miguel (2009) propose, we first estimate a parsimonious model and then add control variables
gradually. The results in Table OA4 in the Online Appendix show that our marginal effect estimates
in columns (1)-(6) are highly stable across different specifications. We measure the stability of marginal
effects by calculating the ratio between the value in the regression including controls (numerator) -
column (6) - and the difference between this effect and the one derived from a regression without
covariates (denominator) - column (1). As Bellows and Miguel (2009) suggest, this ratio shows how
strong the covariance between the unobserved factors explaining entrepreneurial reinvestment decision
and saving practices needs to be, relative to the covariance between observable factors and saving
practices, to explain away the entire effect we find. We compute this ratio for save formally and save
with people inside the household. The ratio turns out to be −5, which suggests that to explain the
full effect of save within household, the covariance between unobserved factors and saving practices
needs to be more than five times as high as the covariance of the included control variables with saving
practices.20 We would like to highlight that in these regressions even adding region fixed effects does
not significantly alter our coefficient estimates although adding regional dummies increases the pseudo
R-square approximately four times, and regional dummies explain most of the variation in the model.
6.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis
In this subsection we investigate the relationship between saving choices and entrepreneurial char-
acteristics, and then offer a test to alleviate endogeneity concerns. To investigate the determinants
of saving choice, we replace the dependent variable reinvest with save within household in (10) and
regress it on our list of control variables as well as one additional variable: distance to bank (section
2.4). The distance to the nearest bank is expected to reduce accessibility of “formal saving services”.
We use two distance to bank measures in our estimations. The first one is a subjective distance mea-
sure constructed by using the question from the enterprise survey: Is there any bank branch in one
hour walking distance to your house? However, there might be a concern regarding the subjective
measure, as entrepreneurs who search for formal saving instruments are also those who are more likely
to know of the existence of a bank in the close proximity. Therefore, the correlation between the search
estimate for save with household members does not change and is statistically significant.
19Note that when we include district fixed effects the total number of observations in the regression decreases to 650
because some districts are excluded from the regression in Probit estimations due to perfect prediction. Our estimates
are robust when we estimate the same model with OLS and do not lose any observations.
20In a similar set-up, Altonji et al. (2005) find a ratio of 3.55. The interpretation is that the larger the ratio, the
lower the likelihood of unobservables to explain away the entire effect.
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intensity and some unobserved characteristics may bias our results. For this reason, we also add an
objective distance measure, the logarithm of ward level minimum distance to the closest bank branch,
MFI or ATM in 2013 which we constructed using data from the Financial Services Map.21
Panel A of Table 5 reports the marginal effect from probit estimations for the saving practice choice
including both subjective and objective distance measures. As we conjecture, the likelihood of saving
with household members is higher when entrepreneurs are farther away from banks. The rest of the
estimates are also in line with our theory. Entrepreneurs who have access to external finance and
entrepreneurs with higher education, better training or high income are more likely to save formally.
Finally, female entrepreneurs seem more likely to save in formal institutions - perhaps to escape from
redistributive pressures.
- Table 5 about here -
To address the endogeneity concerns in the relationship between savings practices and entrepreneurial
reinvestment decisions, we use an instrumental variable methodology which makes use of the determi-
nants of saving practice choice. Since our dependent and main explanatory variables are binary, we use
a system approach, and utilize entrepreneur’s distance to the nearest bank measures as instruments
in a nonlinear recursive bivariate probit model.22 Specifically the model is formulated as follows:
Reinvesti = φ+ δSavehouseholdi + η
′Controlsi + σi, (11)
Savehouseholdi = λ+ κ
′Zi + pi′Controlsi + ui. (12)
We assume that error terms σi and ui are distributed via bivariate normal distribution. So, E[σi] = 0,
E[ui] = 0 and cov[σi, ui] = µ. We identify the system by using the vector Z which includes the distance
to bank measures and use a similar set of controls as in the main specifications.23
There may be exogeneity concerns regarding the relationship between the instruments and reinvest-
ment. Distance to bank measures might correlate with business opportunities and induce entrepreneurs
to reinvest. In order to address these issues, in Panel B of Table 5 we test the exogeneity of our in-
struments. As the standard overidentification test for the 2SLS is not an option with Bivariate Probit
estimation, we utilize an informal test procedure commonly applied in the empirical literature (e.g.
21We use data from the Financial Services Map for Tanzania. This data set gives geographic coordinates of bank
branches, MFIs and ATMs in 2013 across Tanzania. We match these data with the existing geographic coordinates of
the wards from which entrepreneurial data are collected. Then we calculate the distance of the wards to each financial
unit and pick the minimum distance. The correlation between the subjective and objective measure of distance to the
nearest bank branch is -33%.
22We also estimate the same model by using the 2SLS method. We have the same expected signs for the variables
of interest but the coefficient estimates are bigger and imprecise as the variance increases. We believe this is because
both the dependent and independent variables of interest are binary. Chibus et al. (2012) suggests 2SLS may give very
different results and imprecise estimates if the number of observations is lower than 5000 (in our case it is 797).
23We do not use sector dummies in the bivariate probit estimations since our model does not converge. However, not
using sector dummies does not change our results since our main results shown in Table 4 are robust when we do not
control for them.
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Egger et al. (2011); Booker et al. (2013)), where we introduce our instruments into the benchmark
reinvestment regression and study the coefficient estimates. In Panel B of Table 5 we show that the
coefficient estimates from Probit estimations of the instruments are not statistically significant when
we include them as additional explanatory variables in our reinvestment regressions. This implies that
the instruments are correlated with saving practices, but they do not co-vary with reinvestment. We
also show that the estimated cross-correlation coefficient -which we denote with µˆ - is not statistically
significant in either estimation. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that σi and ui are
uncorrelated or reinvestment is exogenous to saving practice choice, once we control for other en-
trepreneurial characteristics. We also test the joint significance of our exogenous variables in the first
stage of our bivariate probit model: they are jointly significant at the 1 percent level (Chi-square=10
and p-value<0.001).
In Panel C of Table 5 we present the recursive bivariate-probit estimates by using the two different
distance measures as our instruments. Also, Table OA5 in the Appendix shows detailed estimation
results for the model, including the control variables. The coefficient estimate of save with household
member remains negative although less significant than before (with a p-value=0.12). We also note
that the estimates for the exogenous variables have the expected signs. The probability to save in the
household decreases as the proximity to bank decreases.
In summary, our IV regression confirms our previous results. We realize the limits of drawing causal
inference from cross-sectional data; however, we see this test as only one of several reported in this
section to show that our findings are not explained by simultaneity bias.
7 Conclusion
Past research has identified several factors that are important for entrepreneurial investment in devel-
oping countries. In this study, we explored how different entrepreneurial saving practices - i.e. saving
via formal financial institutions, individually (under the mattress), within the household or within
informal arrangements, such as ROSCAs - are related with the likelihood of reinvestment. To this
end, we used a novel survey data set collected from MSEs in Tanzania and distinguished multiple
saving practices of entrepreneurs as well their earnings retention behaviour. We motivate our empir-
ical research with a simple theoretical model that shows how different saving practices can influence
investment decisions. Our theoretical and empirical results show that not only are formal savers more
likely to reinvest - a finding already established in the literature, but that different informal savings
patterns have different associations with the likelihood that micro-entrepreneurs reinvest their savings
into their businesses. Specifically, entrepreneurs who save by giving funds to other household members
are less likely to reinvest than formal savers. We address endogeneity concerns and also provide an
extensive list of robustness checks that confirm our results.
Our findings suggest that the entrepreneurs who need to protect their savings from consumption
17
commitments of other household members may benefit most from the introduction of formal sav-
ing instruments in low income areas. Therefore, from a development policy perspective, targeting
entrepreneurs who have low decision power in the household and facilitating their access to formal
saving instruments could be thought as a priority. Our results have important implications for the
interactions between enterprise performance and financial access as well. Enterprises that exploit rein-
vestment opportunities are expected to be more likely to sustain higher productivity levels and survive
more often. Access to efficient saving mechanisms in this respect could be key to facilitate enterprise
performance in financially developing societies.
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Figure 1: Classification of saving practices
Save
Save formal Save informal
Save informal individually Save informal with others
Save with household members Save with people outside household
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Table 1: Summary of model periods
I. Period-1
1. Entrepreneurial (3-dimensional) types are realized.
2. Capital investment into the production technology.
3. Saving for business purposes.
4. Period-1 consumption.
II. Period-2
1. Borrowing to finance liquidity needs.
2. Liquidity injection: Using borrowed funds and savings from period-1.
3. Cash-flow realization from the production technology.
4. Loan repayment.
5. Period-2 consumption
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Table 3: Comparison of company characteristics for reinvesting and not reinvesting businesses
Reinvestment=1 Reinvestment=0 Difference
Borrowed 0.19 0.14 0.05***
(0.39) (0.34)
Education 2.04 1.88 0.15***
(0.88) (0.92)
Female 0.48 0.56 -0.07***
(0.50) (0.50)
Single 0.10 (0.09) 0.01
(0.30) (0.28)
No training 0.70 0.72 -0.02
(0.46) (0.45)
Income 12.03 11.68 0.35***
(1.16) (1.09)
Save 0.80 0.71 0.09***
(0.40) (0.45)
Notes: This table summarizes the difference between the characteristics of the respondents that reinvest or do not reinvest. Column 1
and Column 2 reports listed variables’sample averages for reinvesting and not reinvesting respondents respectively. Column 3 reports the
difference between the sample means. We report standard errors in parenthesis.* p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Estimates for reinvestment and saving/saving practices relationship
(1) (2) (3)
reinvest reinvest reinvest
Panel A: Marginal effect estimates
Save formal 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Save informal 0.06***
(0.01)
Save informal individually 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01)
Save informal with others 0.01
(0.02)
Save with household members -0.01
(0.02)
Save with people outside household 0.04
(0.03)
Borrowed 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.03** -0.03** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Single 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No training -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 5,803 5,803 5,803
Panel B: Comparison of formal and informal saving
Save informal − Save formal -0.03*
[0.07]
Save informal individually − Save formal -0.02 -0.02
[0.18] [0.18]
Save informal with other − Save formal -0.07***
[0.00]
Save with household members − Save formal -0.10***
[0.00]
Save with people outside household − Save formal -0.05*
[0.07]
Notes: This table shows the baseline estimation results for the relationship between saving practices, control variables and reinvestment
likelihood. The detailed variable definitions are given in Table 2. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. In Panel A,
we report report marginal effects estimates at mean values from Probit estimations and robust standard errors in parentheses. To control
for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we add sector and and region dummies to all estimations. In Panel B, we report the
differences between coefficient estimates for formal and informal saving practices, which are shown in Panel A. We conduct a Wald test
to test whether the differences equal to zero and report p-values from that test in brackets. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Instrumental variable estimation
Panel A: Estimates for save informally with household members vs. save formal
Dependent variable: Save informally with household members
Bank branch within one hour walking distance -0.10**
(0.05)
Min. distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI 0.03*
(0.01)
Borrowed -0.35***
(0.04)
Education -0.12***
(0.02)
Female -0.09**
(0.04)
Single -0.02
(0.07)
No training -0.00
(0.04)
Income -0.11***
(0.02)
Panel B: Exogeneity check
Dependent variable: Reinvestment
Save with household members -0.10***
(0.04)
Bank branch within one hour walking distance -0.01
(0.03)
Min. distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI -0.01
(0.01)
Panel C: Bivariate probit estimates
Dependent variable: Reinvestment
Save with household members -0.19⊥
(-0.12)
µˆ 0.22
(0.29)
Observations 797
Notes: This tables reports estimates related to instrumental variables estimation.The sample used for estimations include only formal
savers and informal savers with household members. We additionally control for region fixed effects by adding region dummies in all
estimations. The number of observations at columns 1 and 2 are lower due to missing coordinate information for some wards. We control
for Borrowed, Education, Female, Single, No training, Income, and region dummies in all models. The details for each Panel are as follows.
Panel A shows the first stage estimates for the determinants of the Save informal with household members v.s. Save formal choice. Save
informal with household members is the dependent variable, and Save formal is the base category in the estimations. We report marginal
effect estimates at mean values from Probit estimations and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Panel B informally tests the
exogeneity of our instruments: Bank branch within one hour walking distance and Minimum distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI. If
the estimates are not statistically significant than it implies that they do no have direct impact on reinvestment but have an impact o
reinvestment only through saving practice choice. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimation. We report marginal effect
estimates at mean values from Probit estimations and robust standard errors in the parentheses. In Panel C, we report the coefficient
estimate for save informal with household members from Bivariate Probit estimation. Robust standard errors clustered at ward level are
in parenthesis. Our excluded instruments for saving practice choice between Save with household members and Save formal are Bank
branch within one hour walking distance and Minimum distance to ATM, bank branch, or MFI. We report marginal effect estimates at
mean values and clustered robust standard errors at ward level in the parentheses. µ is the correlation estimate for the error terms from
model 15 and 16. ⊥ p<0.15, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table OA2: OLS estimates for reinvestment and saving/saving practices relationship
(1) (2) (3)
reinvest reinvest reinvest
Panel A: Marginal effect estimates
Save formal 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Save informal 0.06***
(0.01)
Save informal individually 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01)
Save informal with others 0.02
(0.02)
Save with household members -0.01
(0.03)
Save with people outside household 0.04
(0.03)
Borrowed 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.03** -0.03** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Single 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No training -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 5,803 5,803 5,803
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
Panel B: Comparison of formal and informal saving
Save informal − Save formal -0.03*
[0.07]
Save informal individually − Save formal -0.02 -0.03
[0.22] [0.21]
Save informal with other − Save formal -0.08***
[0.00]
Save with household members − Save formal -0.10***
[0.00]
Save with people outside household − Save formal -0.05*
[0.08]
Notes: This table test the robustness of baseline estimation results reported in Table 4 by using OLS estimation. The detailed variable
definitions are given in Table 2. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. In Panel A, we report coefficient estimates
from OLS estimations and robust standard errors in parentheses. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we
add sector and and region dummies to all estimations. In Panel B, we report the differences between coefficient estimates for formal
and informal saving practices, which are shown in Panel A. We conduct a Wald test for whether the differences equal to zero and report
p-values from that test in brackets. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table OA3: Estimates for reinvestment and saving practices relationship - additional control variables
(1) (2)
reinvest reinvest
Panel A: Marginal effect estimates
Save formal 0.08*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02)
Save informal individually 0.06*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01)
Save with household members -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Save with people outside household 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Formal Loan 0.04
(0.04)
Semi formal loan -0.10*
(0.06)
Informal loan 0.02
(0.03)
Initial capital stock 0.01*
(0.00)
Sales per worker 0.02***
(0.01)
Rural 0.01
(0.02)
Size 0.04***
(0.02)
Duration 0.01
(0.01)
Having 2 businesses 0.06***
(0.02)
Having more than 2 businesses 0.11***
(0.04)
Observations 5,753 5,527
Entrepreneurial Dummy Yes No
Activity Dummy Yes No
Region FE Yes No
District FE No Yes
Panel B: Comparison of formal and informal saving
Save informal individually − Save formal -0.02 -0.01
[0.23] [0.23]
Save with household members − Save formal -0.08*** -0.08***
[0.00] [0.00]
Save with people outside household − Save formal -0.05 -0.04*
[0.11] [0.08]
Notes: In this table we test the sensitivity of our estimates presented in Column 3 of Table 4 by controlling for additional variables. The
detailed variable definitions are given in Table 2. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in the estimations. We report marginal effects
estimates at mean values from Probit estimations and robust standard errors in parentheses. Reinvestment is the dependent variable in
all estimations. In Panel B, we report the differences between coefficient estimates for formal and informal saving practices, which are
shown in Panel A. We conduct a Wald test to test whether the differences equal to zero and report p-values from that test in brackets.
In all estimations we control for productivity proxies, education, training, and income but do not report estimates to economize on space.
p¡0.01 * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table OA5: Bivariate Probit Estimates
(1) (2)
Dependendent variable: Reinvestment Save with
household members
Save with household members -0.19⊥
(0.12)
Bank branch within -0.10**
one hour walking distance (0.05)
Min. distance to 0.03*
Atm, bank branch, or MFI (0.01)
Borrowed 0.02 -0.39***
(0.05) (0.13)
Education -0.01 -0.12***
(0.02) (0.02)
Female -0.07** -0.09*
(0.03) (0.05)
Single 0.06 -0.02
(0.05) (0.07)
No training -0.08*** -0.00
(0.32) (0.04)
Income 0.01 -0.11***
(0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.40 5.84***
(1.34) (0.84)
Observations 797 797
Notes: This table shows the detailed bivariate probit estimates for Panel C of Table 5. We report marginal effect estimates at mean
levels for all estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at ward level are in parentheses. We use the sample for Formal Savers and
Household Savers in all estimations. We additionally control for region dummies in the estimations. The details of columns 1 and 2 are
as follows: (1) In column 1, we present the bivariate probit estimates of model (15) which is jointly estimated with model (16) using
distance instruments. (2) In column 2, we present the bivariate probit estimates of model (16) including distance measures and jointly
estimated with model (15). ⊥ p<0.15, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix B: Survey questions
1. Does “I re-invest some of the profits back into the business?” applies to your business? (Yes/No)
2. Including yourself, how many full-time employees did the business employ when it started operations?
(Record number)
3. What was the initial capital of this business? (TSh).
4. What type of business was it? 1. Manufacturing 2. Retail 3. Services 4. Wholesale 5.Agriculture
6.Agricultural processing 7. Other specify
5. Highest level of formal education completed. (1 = none; 2= Preprimary 3= some primary; 4= primary
completed; 5 = some secondary; 6= secondary completed; 7 = technical training after secondary ; 8=
university)
6. Gender? (Male/Female)
7. Did you have any relevant training before the start of this business? ( 1. No training 2. Yes, business
training 3. Yes, technical training)
8. Please give me the letter that best describes the average TOTAL MONTHLY PERSONAL INCOME
before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income i.e. salaries, pensions, income
from investment, etc. (A. Below TSHS 40 000 per month; B. TSHS 35 001 TSHS 40 000 per month;
C. TSHS 40 001 TSHS 60, 000 per month; D. TSHS 60 001 TSHS 80, 000 per month; E. TSHS 80
001 TSHS 100 000 per month; F. TSHS 100 001 TSHS 200 000 per month; G. TSHS 200 001 TSHS
300 000 per month; H. TSHS 300 001 TSHS 400 000 per month; I. TSHS 400 001 TSHS 500 000 per
month; J. TSHS 500 001 TSHS 1,000 000 per month; K. TSHS 1,000, 001 -1,500,000 per month; L.
TSHS 1,500, 001 -2,000,000 per month; M. TSHS 2,000, 001 -2,500,000 per month; N. TSHS 3,000, 001
-3,500,000 per month; O. Over 3,5000,000 per month; P. Refuse to answer; Q. Uncertain/Dont know)
9. (filled in by interviewer) How old is the respondent? (Record in years)
10. Where do you save? (1. In a bank account 2. Saving with a SACCO 3. Saving in a MFI 4. Give to
a household member to keep safe 5. Give to somebody else to keep safe (non-household member) 6.
Keep it in a secret hiding place 7. Put it in merry go round 8. Others specify)
11. As a small business owner, have you ever taken a loan/ borrowed money for business purpose? (1. Yes
2. No)
12. Where did you get the loan to set up or take over the business? Multiple Responses Possible (1. Loan
from bank. 2. Loan from micro finance institution (MFI) 3. Loan from an employer 4. Loan from a
SACCO 5. VICOBA (Village bank) 6. Loans from local Government /government schemes 7. Loan
from friends and/or family 8. Loan from savings club 9. Loan from money lender 10. Loan/credit from
the supplier 11. Loan from donor / NGO. 12. Other)
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